rd_mk_…) is the non-interactive counterpart to a signed-in owner session: it authenticates the control plane at so CI and scripts can manage your account without a human in the loop. It is deliberately constrained — org-scoped, capped at admin, and unable to touch model traffic.
What a management key can and cannot do
The cap is the point: even a leaked management key can never escalate to owner-level operations or make inference calls. It is verified only by the control plane.
1. Issue a key (owner-only)
Only an org owner can mint one. Create it from the dashboard or the control plane:role defaults to (and is capped at) admin. The response includes the plaintext key exactly once — store it in your CI secret manager immediately; it is never re-readable.
2. Use it against the control plane
Send the key as a bearer token to . For example, provision a scoped secret key and a rate limit for a new service in one CI step:3. Rotate and revoke
List active keys withGET /v1/orgs/{orgId}/management-keys, and revoke one when a pipeline is retired or a key may be compromised:
revoked_at takes effect on the very next request with no propagation window. (Only an owner can revoke; a management key cannot revoke keys.)
Least-privilege checklist
- One management key per pipeline, so revoking one never breaks the others.
- Always set an
expires_atand rotate before it lapses. - Store the plaintext only in a secret manager — never in source, logs, or an environment file committed to the repo.
- Reach for a scoped secret key instead when a workload only needs the data plane; a management key is for the control plane.
Related
Automate with a management key
A CI walkthrough end to end.
Authentication & API keys
Where management keys sit among the six credentials.
Security best practices
Least-privilege and rotation across all credentials.
Control-plane reference
Every control-plane route and schema.